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BOOKREVIEW

Principles for a Catholic Morality
by
Timothy E. O'ConneU
Revised Edition, Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1990, xvi + 303 pp. $14.95, paper
This is the revised edition of a work first published in 1978. The most significant changes in the
revised edition are: (1) a slight reorganization of the chapters in Part I, (2) the addition of a new
chapter, "The Current Debate," in Part III, and (3) the acknowledgement by O'Connell that there
is at least one exceptionlessor absolute specific moral norm, namely, that prohibiting the
intentional or direct killing of innocent human beings and his seeming repudiation of the
proportionalist method of making moral judgments which he espoused in the first edition. Below,
after presenting an overview of the volume, I will take up in more detail the reasons why O'Connell
now accepts as universally valid the norm proscribing the intentional killing of innocent human
beings and his current attitude toward proportionalism.
O'Connell divides his material into four somewhat loosely related parts. Parts II and III, on the
human person and the moral world, are more integrally related than other parts of the work, since
they deal with the human person who is called to freedom and with the criteria for determining the
moral quality of human acts. The introductory essays of Part I take up the meaning of moral
theology, its history (very schematically and indeed superficially outlined), Christ and moral
theology, and Jesus and moral living. The chapter entitled "Jesus and Moral Living" is
substantively the same as the chapter entitled "Elements of a Biblical Morality" in the first edition,
and in this revised edition is placed after the chapter on Christ and moral theology, whereas in the
first edition its counterpart was placed before the chapter on Christ and moral theology. O'Connell,
seemingly, came to realize that "Elements of a Biblical Morality" was simply too inaccurate a title
for the material taken up in the chapter. But what strikes me as quite significant is that O'Connell
seems to be distinguishing, in these chapters, between the Christ of faith and the Jesus "of personal
encounter," whose authenticity, however, is to ''be tested ... through comparison with the Jesus of
the Bible" (p. 36), the Jesus who offers us a way-of-living summed up in the biblical themes of
covenant, reign of God, repentence, law, love, and beatitudes. O'Connell's basic point in these
chapters is that Christian morality is essentially simply human morality, and that to model one's
moral life on Jesus is simply to be fully human.
Part II, substantively unchanged in the present edition, is concerned with the moral person and
with such issues as human acts, freedom, and theology of sin and the difference between mortal and
venial sin, cOnscience and Christian vocation. In these chapters O'Connen makes a sharp
distinction between what he terms "categorical freedom," or the freedom of choice involved in
human acts, and what he terms "transcendental freedom," or the freedom to determine who we are
by taking a fundamental stance that gives our lives "direction, significance, and definition" (p. 72).
The act of transcendental freedom is what O'Connell cal1s "fundamental option," and "inner act of
self-definition" (p. 73). Since we become, or fail to become, "fully human" only "by the exercise of
basic, transcendental freedom" (p. 91), it follows that "mortal sin as an act is nothing else than a
synonym for fundamental option"; it is an act "by which we substantially reject God and assume
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instead a posture apart from, and in alienation from, God" (p. 91). Consequently, "mortal sin is not
precisely the doing of anyone categorical act" (p. 91). Rather, categorical acts (the objects of
categorical freedom and not offundamental freedom), such as committing adultery or killing an
innocent person, are not themselves mortal sins, although "these objective acts are 'occasions of
sin' " (p. 91).
In other words, according to O'Connell, it is possible for a person freely to choose to commit
adultery or to kill an innocent human being and not commit mortal sin. Although acts of this kind
may provide "occasions" for sinning mortally, i.e., for making a mortally bad fundamental option,
they do not necessarily make one to be a mortal sinner nor is it necessary that one make a bad
fundamental option in freely choosing, say, to commit adultery.
The Problem

O'Connell's problem here is that he relocates self-determination from the free choices which we
make every day to an alleged act of fundamental freedom at the core of our existence and of which
we are aware only in a nonreflexive way. At the heart of his problem is his belief that human acts are
material events that come and go and do not abide within the person, whereas in truth human acts
are not physical events but rather acts of the person. At their core is a self-determining choice which
abides within the person as a disposition to further choices of the same kind. It is, indeed, in and
through the actions we freely choose that we give to ourselves our identity as human persons; it is in
and through them that we give to ourselves our character. Here it is worth noting that in this revised
edition O'Connell has not even attempted to respond to the trenchant criticism given of the
fundamental option theory he espouses by others, in particular by Joseph Boyle, Jr., in his
outstanding essay, "Freedom, the Human Person, and Human Action" (in Principles of the
Catholic Moral Life. ed. William E. May [Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1981], pp. 237-267).
In Part II O'Connell also takes up the meaning of conscience and the relationship between the
conscience of a Catholic and the teaching of the magisterium. He distinguishes between
conscience/ I, which is a "general sense of value, and awareness of personal responsibility ...
utterly emblematic of the human person" (p. 110), consciencel2, which deals with the specific
perception of values, and conscience/3, which "is consummately concrete . .. [being] the concrete
judgment of a specific person pertaining to her or his own immediate action" (p. 112). Since
conscience/ l and conscience/3 are uniquely personal and inviolable, and since conscience/3 is
"infallible" (p. 114) insofar as it is "the fmal norm by which a person's action must be guided" (p.
112), the teachings ofthe magisterium on moral questions intersect only with consciencel2, where
there is the possibility of disagreement and error. The teachings of the magisterium on moral
questions, which in O'Connell's judgment have never been infallibly proposed (p. 116), can
illuminate conscience. They cannot, however, bind the conscience because the magisterium, in
proposing specific moral norms, finds itself in the same situation as does the individual person in the
endeavor to discover these values. "What we have," O'Connell writes, "are teachings that,
although assisted by the Spirit, are nonetheless susceptible to error and therefore fallible" (p. 116). It
thus follows, according to O'Connell, that Catholics have a right to dissent from authoritative
teachings of the magisterium on specific moral issues and to shape their lives by norms other than
those proposed by the magisterium. It is instructive to note that O'Connell, in considering the
possibility that the magisterium can propose specific moral norms infallibly, notes that some
authors, e.g., Germain Grisez and John Ford, maintain that some of the specific moral norms
proposed by the magisterium have been infallibly proposed by the ordinary and universal
magisterium of the Church. After noting this, O'Connell calls attention to the writings of
theologians who challenge this view and concludes by saying, "it is fair to say that the opinion [of
Grisez and others] is generally regarded as extreme, if not eccentric" (n. 11, p. 268). What is most
instructive about O'Connell's discussion of this issue is that he fails to inform his readers that Grisez
has patiently replied to the objections levelled by the theologians whom O'Connell mentions and
that they have not sought to reply to Grisez's critique of their positions. Apparently, the argument
from the authority of the schola theologorum is far stronger, in O'Connell's judgment, than the
evidence and unanswered arguments marshalled by Grisez, not to mention the teaching of the
magisterium itself.
In Part III O'Connell is concerned with the "moral world," with objective morality, and the
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criteria for distinguishing between morally good and morally bad actions. In the earlier edition
O'Connell had espoused a form of the proportionalist method of making moral judgments which
he called "macroconsequentialism," and, in company with other advocates of this method of
making moral judgments had concluded that there are no true moral absolutes or specific moral
norms universally proscribing sorts of human actions described in nonmorally evaluative language
(e.g., sexual relations with someone who is not one's spouse, i.e., adultery,lying, the intentional
killing of the innocent, etc.). In the present edition O'Connell has slightly modified his position in
the light of criticisms levelled against proportionalism. He now acknowledges that there is at least
one kind of human act that is intrinsically evil (the killing of innocent human beings) and that,
correspondingly, there is at least one exceptionless or absolute specific moral norm, namely, that
proscribing the intentional or direct killing of innocent human beings. According to O'Connell, this
sort of act is "wrong because in any circumstance whatever it represents an affront to the very
enterprise of morality ... it is a rejection of morality itself, for morality ... is nothing else than the
responsibility that follows from the intrinsic dignity of human persons" (p. 172). It attacks the very
subjects "on whom the very existence of the moral enterprise is built" (p. 172).
But this is the only moral absolute that O'Connell acknowledges. He believes that other sorts of
acts described as intrinsically evil in the Catholic tradition, and correspondingly prohibited by
absolute norms, such as suicide,lying, extramarital intercourse, and divorce and remarriage cannot
be shown to be such (pp. 189-193). For him, one cannot say that willful self-destruction is always
immoral. It is instructive to compare his views here with the teaching of Vatican Council II in
Gaudium et spes, n. 27.
Proportionalism Partially Renounced

By acknowledging that there is at least one sort of act that is intrinsically evil, O'Connell believes
that he must renounce his previous acceptance of the proportionalist method of making moral
judgments. Yet he is still very sympathetic to this approach, and indeed he still shares its basic
presuppositions, of which one is that we can morally appraise human actions only "on the basis of
their actual effects on human persons and on the living of human life" (p. 203). He simply comes to
the conclusion that, appraising human actions on this basis, we can confidently assert that the
killing of innocent human beings is always morally wrong insofar as he judges that this sort of
human act is an attack on "the very existence and meaning of morality" (p. 210). He believes that
the "basic human goods" approach advocated by Germain Grisez and others, while useful, is
certainly inadequate. In his judgment Grisez and those who agree with him, while denying that
basic human goods are commensurable, in fact surreptitiously introduce judgments comparatively
evaluating these goods into their moral analyses (pp. 207-209). Here O'Connell is simply mistaken,
and fails to note that Grisez and his associates recognize that people indeed do make comparative
judgments and indeed make commensurations both in nonmoral situations and in situations where
a moral norm provides the means ofmaking comparative assessments, which is quite different from
comparing the incomparable in order to come up with a moral norm, as proportionalism requires.
O'Connell, seeking a "mediating" position between proportionalism and the so-called "basic
goods" approach, says that we must "go beyond them to a vision that incorporates the best of both"
(p. 205). However, when he seeks to do this, he ends up back in proportionalism. He admits,
astonishingly, that while he cannot theoretically justify the comparative assessments needed to
determine whether or not the consequences of human actions are ultimately beneficial or not for
human persons, he nonetheless believes that we can and indeed must make such comparative
assessments simply because this squares with our experience (p. 211). Thus, despite his seeming
repudiation of the proportionalist method of making moral judgments, his proposal for "going
beyond" both proportionalism and the "basic goods" apprpach ends up as a proportionalist
.
proposal.
Part IV is quite brief, consisting of two short essays on the question of a "Christian" and a final
assessment of Catholic morality today and tomorrow. O'Connell thinks that an ethics is
"Christian" because of its vision and motive, but not because of any specific Christian moral
obligations. Indeed, for him in the end the "natural law" and the "law of Christ" are one and the
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While O'Connell, I believe, is to be congratulated on admitting publicly that he was wrong in
denying that there are any moral absolutes and for acknowledging that the intentional killing of
innocent human beings is an intrinsically evil act, his study is nonetheless marred by a very faulty
understanding of human freedom and action, of the role of the magisterium of the Church, a
muddled account of moral reasoning which ends up, paradoxically, in being the proportionalism
that he seemingly rejects, and a far too humanistic understanding of the nature of the Christian
moral life. It is, unfortunately, a book that cannot be recommended for any who believe that the
Christian moral life utterly transforms our existence as moral beings and that the Church is the pillar
of truth and that its magisterium is authorized to speak in Christ's name, authentically interpreting
the demands of the natural law in the light of Christ's redemption.
- William E. May

Michael J. McGivney Professor of Moral Theology
John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family
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